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Highlights
￿ The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a
number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options
made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are parti-
cular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are
not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major
drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to
symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate
fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand manage-
ment. The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms.
￿ The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies
could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic
situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations.
￿ The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of
the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union
and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro
area’s aggregate fiscal stance.
Zsolt Darvas (zsolt.darvas@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel. Erkki Vihriälä
(erkki.vihriala@bruegel.org) is an economist at the Finnish Ministry of Finance. This
paper was prepared for the European Parliament’s Economic Dialogue with the Presi-
dent of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, 5 September 2013. The paper benefitted
from comments and suggestions from colleagues inside and outside Bruegel, for which
the authors are grateful. Copyright remains with the European Parliament at all times. DOES THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER DELIVER THE
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1. See a summary of the
2012 and 2013 recommen-
dations and the European
Commission’s assessment
of the implementation of
the 2012 recommendations
in European Parliament
(2013). An independent
assessment of the first two
rounds of the European
Semester can be found in
Hallerberg, Marzinotto and
Wolff (2012a,b).
1 INTRODUCTION
The European Semester, a yearly cycle of eco-
nomic policy coordination inaugurated in 2011,
lies at the heart of the European Union’s new eco-
nomic governance framework. It starts with the
setting of the main priorities by the European Com-
mission in the ‘Annual Growth Survey’, followed by
the submission and assessment of EU member
state National Reform Programmes and Stability
and Convergence Programmes. It concludes with
country-specific recommendations and recom-
mendations for the euro area as a whole.
EU member states are expected to implement the
recommendations. The two main EU surveillance pro-
cedures, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), are
integrated into the European Semester, and non-
compliance with the Council recommendations may
trigger procedural steps, including sanctions.
The third European Semester was concluded by
the Council recommendations on 9 July 2013. In
this Briefing Paper, we assess the main fiscal and
macro-structural challenges and recommenda-
tions for the euro area and its member states.
Given the space constraints of this briefing paper,
we focus on the main challenges for the euro area
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and therefore we cannot assess the recommen-
dations for all 17 euro-area member states1.
Instead, in addition to recommendations for the
euro area as a whole, we assess the recommen-
dations for the euro area's five largest economies:
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
These five countries account for 83 percent of
euro-area GDP, meaning that they represent well
the diversity of the euro area.
We first characterise the main economic, fiscal
and financial conditions in the euro area to pres-
ent the situation against which the recommenda-
tions should be assessed. This is followed by the
summary and our assessment of the main rec-
ommendations for the euro area as a whole and
for the five countries. For comparison, we also
report the International Monetary Fund's recom-
mendations in the framework of the Article IV con-
sultations for all five countries and the euro area.
Finally, we summarise our conclusions.
2 ECONOMIC AND FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE EURO AREA
The figures in this section highlight the main eco-
nomic and fiscal developments in the euro area,
which provide the basis for assessing the Council’s
and the IMF’s recommendations in the next section.
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Figure 1: Main indicators of the economic cycle
Source: European Commission Spring 2013 forecast.03
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The EU’s fiscal strategy was based on the convic-
tion that fiscal austerity is needed to restore trust,
to limit increases in debt and thereby to lay the
foundations for sustainable growth. Undoubtedly,
low public debt has great benefits. But premature
fiscal consolidation at the euro-area level has side
effects, and the need for fiscal consolidation at the
country-level varies.
The public-debt-to-GDP ratio is indeed high and
rising in Italy and in Spain, and therefore there was
no alternative to fiscal consolidation (the only
question was its pace). However, debt levels are
lower in Germany and the Netherlands and no one
questions their sustainability. From 2010 to 2013,
Germany consolidated its primary structural bal-
ance by about 3 percent of GDP and the Nether-
lands by about 2 percent of GDP. These two
countries have strong policy regimes and more
expansive fiscal policies better aligned to their
negative output gaps, and the needs of the euro
area would have not led to concerns about debt
sustainability. As a comparison, the US and Japan
continue to borrow at low interest rates despite
their much higher public debts and deficits. There-
fore, the issue is not a return to ‘failed old debt-
making policies’ in highly indebted countries, but
to ensure fiscal stabilisation at the euro-area level
as long as private demand is weak.
Buti and Carnot (2013) challenge some criticisms
of the EU’s fiscal strategy and essentially con-
clude that fiscal consolidation was necessary in
southern Europe, a conclusion that we agree with.
But they are silent on developments of the aggre-
gate fiscal stance of the euro area, which was
strongly influenced by the major fiscal consolida-
In 2012, euro-area GDP fell by 0.6 percent. It is
expected to continue to fall in 2013, despite the
recent positive quarterly growth rate in 2013Q2.
The output gap is forecast to widen from -1.2 per-
cent of GDP in 2011 to -2.9 percent in 2013. There
is also a growth deceleration in Germany and a
forecast widening of the output gap to -1.0 percent
in 2013, though arguably, Germany is in the best
economic condition among the countries we con-
sider. In the Netherlands, the output gap is
expected to widen to -3.6 percent, and to even
more in Spain and Italy. The unemployment rate
has also increased in all countries except Ger-
many in recent years. Private consumption and
private investment have also declined in the euro
area during the past two years. Overall, the cyclical
position in the whole euro area has clearly wors-
ened since 2011.
The euro area's structural primary budget balance
(ie the balance excluding interest payments and
cleaned from the impact of the economic cycle and
one-time items) is expected to improve from -1.6
percent of GDP in 2010 to 1.7 percent in 2013,
reflecting an annual fiscal consolidation effort of 1
percent of GDP per year during the past three years.
Therefore, a rather significant fiscal consolidation
has been implemented at a time when the cycli-
cal position of the euro area has deteriorated con-
siderably. There is no model that claims that this
was an optimal policy (see Box 1). Instead, fiscal
stabilisation should allow automatic stabilisers to
run in a cyclical downturn (in which case the struc-
tural deficit remains stable and the actual deficit
worsens), or even implement a fiscal stimulus
(when the structural deficit also worsens).
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Figure 2: Main public ﬁnance indicators (% GDP)
Source: European Commission Spring 2013 forecast.2. Darvas (2010) warned
that premature fiscal
consolidation at the euro-
area level would likely lead
to these four side effects.
tion in Germany and other euro-area member
states with strong fiscal fundamentals during the
past few years. They only note that the fiscal
stance of Germany is now broadly neutral: again,
this assessment does not consider the implica-
tion of the German fiscal stance for the aggregate
euro-area fiscal stance at a time when the cyclical
position of the euro area is very weak.
The premature aggregate euro-area fiscal consol-
idation is hindering the deleveraging of the private
sector and rendering it more difficult for southern
euro-area member states to implement their nec-
essary fiscal consolidation. It is also making more
difficult the reduction in intra-euro area current-
account imbalances and pushing the euro area to
a current account surplus. This last effect can
worsen global imbalances2. 
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BOX 1: ACADEMIC FINDINGS ON FISCAL STABILISATION, INCLUDING IN A MONETARY UNION
Is fiscal policy needed to stabilise output? If the central bank is not constrained by the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates, the classical models suggest no role for fiscal policy in stabilisa-
tion (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2011). Mankiw and Weinzierl argued further that even if the zero-bound
is binding, the central bank can stabilise aggregate demand by committing to future expansionary
policy. Krugman (1998) made the same point by arguing that with policy rates at zero, the central
bank faces the dilemma of “promising credibly to be irresponsible”. If that fails, Mankiw and Weinz-
erl, and Krugman, agree that expansionary fiscal policy can increase output, although the former
note that welfare gains are larger if the fiscal reaction consists of tax changes rather than increased
public spending. In practice, central banks do not seem to offset fiscal policy changes completely
all the time. Notably Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) found that fiscal policy has significant
effects on output, particularly in recessions.
The textbook role for fiscal policy in a multi-country monetary union is to counteract national shocks.
Ferrero (2009) argued that countries should respond to idiosyncratic shocks by varying distorting
taxation and government debt. Gali and Monacelli (2008) concluded that when the central bank tar-
gets aggregate price stability, national fiscal policy to smooth idiosyncratic shocks is desirable both
from the viewpoint of the individual country and the entire monetary union. Nevertheless, in the
current situation, countries that could most use fiscal policy flexibility do not have, or are at risk of
losing, market access. Therefore an important question is whether fiscal expansion in countries with
fiscal space would have positive spillover effects and could be used as an (imperfect) substitute.
Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) found that the effect on output of a currency union-wide fiscal
shock is greater for most countries than the effect of a similarly sized national shock. As the fiscal
costs of an aggregate shock are considerably smaller for each single country than the costs of purely
domestic expansion, this favours coordination of fiscal policies. However, the impact on particular
countries depends on their openness and trade links. For instance, Cwik and Wieland (2011) argued
that the spillover effects are quantitatively small.
It is not realistic though to expect first-best coordination of fiscal policies decided by 17 euro-area
national parliaments. Therefore, there is on-going discussion about the need for a European federal
fiscal authority (Darvas, 2012b; Wolff, 2012). Proponents of this argue that it would act as a sta-
biliser during an economic downturn. Asdrubali et al(1996) estimated in their seminal paper that
the US federal state smoothed about 13 percent of shocks to regional output between 1963-90.
Cross-border flows of capital income and credit markets smoothed another 62 percent of shocks. In
another study, Mélitz and Zumer (2002) found that the central government absorbed about 20 per-
cent of regional shocks to personal income in the United Kingdom, the US and France, while the
share was lower in Canada. Finally, Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) showed that risk sharing in the
euro area is substantially lower than elsewhere. Furthermore, it is considerably lower during large
downturns when it is most needed. Fiscal integration could therefore contribute to the stabilisation
of the economic cycle in the euro area, in conjuction with other benefits, further development of
cross-border credit and capital markets.Darvas & Vihriälä  DOES THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER DELIVER THE RIGHT POLICY ADVICE?
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3. We note that in Spain, the
major reason for the fall in
ULC was massive layoffs
(Darvas, 2012a), with
adverse social
consequences.
4. Using a simple account-
ing identity, it is possible to
calculate the roles played
by exports and imports in
the improvement of the
trade balance. For example,
in the case of Spain,
imports contributed by
about two-thirds when con-
stant-price data is used. But
there were major changes
in the terms of trade and
current-price data suggests
that exports had a two-third
role. Beyond the accounting
identity relating exports
and imports to the trade
balance, the impact of
domestic demand collapse
on both imports and
exports are not known. For
example, Esteves and Rua
(2013) argue that there is a
strong negative relationship
between exports and
domestic demand in a
recession. Therefore, there
is much controversy about
the roles played by
improved competitiveness
and the collapse of domes-
tic demand in the improve-
ment of the trade balance.
We therefore conclude that the overall euro-area
fiscal stance, significant consolidation from 2011
to 2013, was inconsistent with the sizeable dete-
rioration of the cyclical position. Lack of an author-
ity responsible for the aggregate fiscal stance has
therefore been a major handicap for the euro area
(Darvas 2012b, Wolff 2012). 
In addition to fiscal consolidation, another concern
has been the adjustment of external imbalances.
There has been significant progress on this. The
previous current-account deficits of Spain and
Italy are expected to turn to surpluses, and Spain’s
intra-euro real affective exchange rate has depre-
ciated significantly (though Italy’s has not)3.
However, while Spain's export performance is
indeed impressive (Italy's less so), it needs to be
further improved and sustained. Also, it is not easy
to determine the parts played by improved com-
petitiveness and the collapse of domestic demand
in the improvement of the trade balance4. Spain
has a close to minus 90 percent of GDP net inter-
national investment position (NIIP), which is
largely comprised of debt and is much larger than
the 35 percent threshold in the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure (MIP). Therefore, Spain's
trade balance should shift to a sizeable surplus in
order to ensure external debt sustainability. Italy
does not have a large negative NIIP, but its exports
have long been losing market share and its eco-
nomic growth was low even before the crisis. Real
exchange rate depreciation could foster the devel-
opment of the tradable sector, which in turn could
improve overall economic growth as a larger share
of the economy would face international competi-
tion, fostering productivity growth. Therefore,
major adjustments still lie ahead. Since euro-area
member states do not have a stand-alone cur-
rency, intra-euro adjustment is necessary (though
not sufficient).
Finally, the weak state of domestic banking sys-
tems in southern Europe constrains access to
credit. Non-performing loans continued to
increase in Italy and Spain in 2012. Domestic
problems are accentuated by the simultaneous
re-nationalisation of banking systems. Foreign
banks have significantly reduced their exposure
to southern Europe and have therefore withdrawn
a major source of bank funding (Figure 4 on the
next page). Although cross-border intermediation
has also decreased in stronger countries, this is
less of a problem for them because they received
a massive private capital inflow which also
pushed down interest rates. Furthermore, the
nature of the reduction of bank exposure to Ger-
many and the Netherlands was more related to the
Lehman Brothers crash, and exposure broadly
stabilised soon after.
Based on these observations, we highlight five
major challenges for the euro area:
￿ Aligning the aggregate fiscal stance of the euro
area with the aggregate economic situation;
￿ Stimulating private investment and consump-
tion;
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￿ Reducing unemployment in the harder-hit
countries by either creating jobs in those coun-
tries, or helping intra-EU mobility;
￿ Fostering the symmetric adjustment of intra-
euro price/wage divergences and external
imbalances;
￿ Fully reversing financial fragmentation. 
3 THE JULY 2013 COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS
We now turn to the July 2013 Council recommen-
dations, which are summarised in Table 1.
When assessing the Council recommendations,
one has to bear in mind that they are required to
comply with the euro area's new economic and
fiscal governance framework. For example, even
if a case can be made for a more active fiscal
policy at the euro-area level, the revised Stability
and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact (Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union) set limits on struc-
tural deficits5. Also, monetary policy is the
responsibility of the independent European Cen-
tral Bank and therefore the Council should not give
recommendations that are related to the author-
ity of the ECB. The recommendations therefore
have to be assessed within the remits of the fiscal
framework, while the governance framework itself
has to be assessed separately (which is beyond
the scope of this briefing paper).
We make the following observations:
1 A number of euro-area recommendations are
not (or not properly) reflected in country-
specific recommendations.Specific examples
are the aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area
(see point 2 below), the adjustment of both
current-account surpluses and deficits (point
7) and financial-sector repair (point 9). Who
will be responsible for allocating among euro-
area member states the tasks for the euro area
if the Council does not do this? The country-
specific recommendations do not detail the
contribution of the particular country to the
implementation of the euro-area
recommendations. There has therefore been
no improvement since Hallerberg, Marzinotto
and Wolff (2012) concluded that “...the
European Commission and Council issue...
separate recommendations to the euro area.
Still, this seems like an empty exercise. It is not
clear who the euro-area recommendations are
addressed to and who is supposed to
implement them. Euro-area considerations
should not be treated in a separate document,
but should cut across all country-specific
recommendations for euro-area countries.”
2 The concept of the “aggregate fiscal stance of
the euro area”is a largely empty concept.The
recommendations call for an “aggregate fiscal
stance for the euro area as a whole to ensure
a growth friendly and differentiated fiscal
policy”. The rest of the recommendation sug-
gests that the Eurogroup discusses the Com-
mission’s opinion of the draft budgetary plans
of each member state of the euro area (which
should reflect country-specific situations and
must be in line with the Stability and Growth
Pact) and how they interact. However, the rec-
ommendation does not specify the ideal
aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area and
therefore there is no way to allocate the ideal
stance between countries. The adopted
bottom-up approach will not ensure that the
aggregate of the national actions of the 17
member states will coincide with the needs of
the euro-area economy. Also, the country-spe-
cific suggestions do not consider the spillover
effects from one country to other countries or
the euro area as a whole.
In our view, mere coordination of fiscal policies
will not achieve an optimal fiscal policy for the
euro area, because national fiscal policies are
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approved by national parliaments, and
national parliamentarians primarily consider
their own countries, and not the euro area as a
whole, when setting fiscal policy. Only the
establishment of a euro-area fiscal institution
responsible for managing the euro area's fiscal
stance (financed ideally from direct tax rev-
enues) would be able to achieve an adequate
aggregate fiscal stance (Darvas, 2012b, Wolff,
2012).
3 Certain principles are not applied equally. As
laid out in the document for the euro area,
member states with “significant and poten-
tially rising risk premia should limit deviations
from the nominal balance targets even
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF JULY 2013 MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL
Euro area Germany The Netherlands  France Italy Spain
Fiscal policy Aggregate fiscal stance of
the euro area should ensure
growth-friendly and differ-
entiated fiscal policy;
Allow automatic stabilisers to
function along adjustment path.
Preserve sound fiscal posi-
tion
Correct excessive deficit by
2014 and achieve MTO by
2015
Correct excessive deficit by
2015 and achieve MTO by
2016
Deficit below 3 % in 2013;
Achieve MTO by 2014
Correct excessive deficit by
2016 and achieve MTO by
2018
Demand
management
Coordinate aggregate fiscal
stance;
Address employment crisis.
Promote wage growth by
reducing high taxes and
social security contributions.
Protect growth-sensitive
public expenditure.
Growth friendly consolida-
tion and tax reform.
Growth-friendly fiscal con-
solidation;
Upgrade infrastructure.
Reduce government arrears
Labour
market
Coordinate and monitor
national reforms;
Tackle the social conse-
quences of the crisis and
rising unemployment, in
line with the Compact for
Growth and Jobs and the EU
Youth Guarantee.
Raise the educational
achievement of disadvan-
taged people;
Improve incentives to work
for second-earners and low-
skilled;
Integrate long-term
unemployed.
Increase labour market par-
ticipation by reducing tax
disincentives on labour and
reforming employment pro-
tection legislation.
Unemployment benefit
system reform;
Increase labour market par-
ticipation (focus on older
workers);
Promote apprenticeships.
Increase labour market par-
ticipation;
Improve incentives to work
for second-earners and low-
skilled;
Better targeting of social
transfers.
Evaluate the need for fur-
ther labour market reforms;
Improve unemployment
agencies;
Youth guarantee;
Active labour market policies
to improve employability.
Product
market/
business
environment 
Coordinate and monitor
national reforms.
Stimulate competition in
services.
(nothing) Stimulate competition in
services;
Foster innovation and
exports;
Improve the business envi-
ronment.
Stimulate competition in
services;
Growth-friendly tax reform
(reduce taxes on labour and capi-
tal; increase taxes on consump-
tion, property and environment).
Stimulate competition in
services;
Improve the business envi-
ronment.
Financial
system
Assess reasons for differences
in lending rates to SMEs;
Stress tests and banking
balance sheet repair;
Burden sharing in bank
recapitalisation;
Credible fiscal backstop;
Remove supervisory incentives
for financial fragmentation;
Accelerate banking union.
Pursue consolidation in the
sector.
(nothing) (nothing) Extend good corporate gov-
ernance;
Asset-quality screening;
Promote non-bank financ-
ing.
Recapitalise banks and pro-
mote non-bank financing.
Intra-euro
area adjust-
ment
Address national distortions
to saving and investment in
both current account deficit
and surplus countries;
Implement effectively the MIP.
(nothing) (nothing) Lower labour costs. Labour market and wage
setting reform to align pro-
ductivity and wages.
Support schemes for inter-
nationalisation of firms
Private debt (nothing) (nothing) (nothing) Reduce debt bias in corpo-
rate taxation.
Resolution of non-perform-
ing loans.
Reduce debt bias in corpo-
rate taxation;
Review insolvency framework
for companies & individuals.
Public
ﬁnance man-
agement
(nothing) Implement debt brake in all
Länder.
Cost-effectiveness of
healthcare spending;
Efficiency of the tax
system;
Extend public procurement.
Pension, health and long-
term care reform.
Reform of the relation
between central and local
governments;
Cost-effectiveness of
healthcare spending;
Efficiency and simplifica-
tion of the tax system;
Public expenditure effi-
ciency;
Pension and health reform.
Efficiency and quality of
public expenditures;
Improve coordination
between layers of govern-
ment;
Public expenditure effi-
ciency;
Extend public procurement;
Improve tax collection.
Independent fiscal council
by 2013;
Reform local administration;
Cost-effectiveness of
healthcare spending;
Efficiency of overall public
administration;
Remove indexation of
public expenditures;
Pension reform;
Tax reform.
Other reforms Housing rental market;
Reduce mortgage tax
deductibility.
Judicial system efficiency;
Repress corruption;
Improve EU fund management;
Education reform;
Fight tax evasion and the
shadow economy.
Judicial system efficiency;
Education reform;
Housing rental market.
Source: Bruegel based on oﬃcial documents.08
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against worse-than-expected macroeconomic
conditions”. The risk premia of Italy and Spain
are broadly similar. The quoted principle was
probably applied to Italy (“Ensure that the
deficit remains below 3% of GDP in 2013”), but
not to Spain, a country (along with France and
the Netherlands) that was given more time to
meet the nominal deficit target of 3 percent of
GDP. We note that it was the right decision to
extend the deadline for meeting the nominal
targets at a time when the economic situation
became worse than expected, but it is unwise
to set principles and to apply them differently
in different countries.
4 The fiscal strategy continues to reflect a con-
solidation bias, which is not consistent with
the economic situation of the euro area. We
have noted that the euro area's challenging
cyclical situation warrants a less-austere
aggregate fiscal stance. But by recommending
that Germany preserves its sound fiscal posi-
tion, and that other countries pursue fiscal
consolidation, the aggregate fiscal stance of
the euro area will be too tight, even if the pace
of consolidation at the euro-area aggregate
level slows down6. According to the European
Commission, Germany has met her medium
term objectives (MTO) with a wide margin in
the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) and is forecast to have a 0.3-0.4
percent of GDP structural budget surplus in
2013-14, well above the 0.5 percent structural
deficit threshold of the Fiscal Compact. The
deficit goals at the federal level under the
national debt brake rule were also achieved
well ahead of schedule. Therefore, the fiscal
rules would have allowed more broad-based
tax cuts to stimulate private investment and
consumption and measures to increase public
investment, but no such recommendations
are made for Germany.
5 A major weakness is that demand manage-
ment is only indirectly included in the euro-
area recommendations, and the
recommendation for Germany is feeble. The
Council’s proposal for coordinating the aggre-
gate fiscal stance of the euro area and attempt-
ing to reduce unemployment may increase
demand. However, we have already argued
6. We also note that France
has – correctly – not
received a recommendation
to implement public spend-
ing cuts, though it has one
of the highest public spend-
ing ratio (relative to GDP) in
the EU.
7. Among the 17 euro-area
countries, the Netherlands
had the highest labour force
participation rate (79.3 per-
cent) and the highest
employment rate (72.5 per-
cent) in 2012, followed by
Germany (77.1 percent and
72.8 percent, respectively),
while the euro-area aver-
ages are 72 percent and
63.8 percent.
that the aggregate fiscal stance is largely an
empty concept; furthermore, there was no
direct recommendation for the euro area to
increase demand, despite the continued
decline in private consumption and invest-
ment. Among the five countries that we con-
sider, only Germany received a suggestion that
it should boost domestic demand. Yet while
the actual text includes important policy goals,
overall, it fails to emphasise the main point of
stimulating aggregate private demand: “Sus-
tain conditions that enable wage growth to
support domestic demand. To this purpose,
reduce high taxes and social security contri-
butions, especially for low-wage earners and
raise the educational achievement of disad-
vantaged people. Maintain appropriate acti-
vation and integration measures, especially
for the long-term unemployed. Facilitate the
transition from non-standard employment
such as mini-jobs into more sustainable forms
of employment. Take measures to improve
incentives to work and the employability of
workers, in particular for second earners and
low-skilled, also with a view to improving their
income. To this end, remove disincentives for
second earners and further increase the avail-
ability of fulltime childcare facilities and all-
day schools.” Reducing taxes and social
security contributions are the right tools, but
the sentence in which this suggestion is made
also calls for the educational achievement of
disadvantaged people to be raised, suggest-
ing that this is a major channel for increased
demand (with which we disagree). The rest of
the paragraph emphasises the goal of increas-
ing employment, which is of course important,
but it is unlikely to contribute to a significant
increase in domestic demand in a country in
which both the labour-force participation rate
and the employment rate are the second high-
est in the euro area, and in which the unem-
ployment rate is at a two-decade low7.
6 Investment is not a priority.Related to the pre-
vious point, while the 2012 euro-area recom-
mendations stated the goal of increasing
public investment, this recommendation was
not made in 2013. Also, no recommendations
were made for Germany to increase public
investment (which is among the lowest in the09
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euro area relative to GDP – see Figure 5) or to
stimulate private investment (which is also
among the lowest). We single out Germany
here because it is the country with the largest
external surpluses and could arguably benefit
from more domestic sources of growth.
Because of its size, its actions also have the
most significant spillover effects on other
countries. 
7 According to the Council, the adjustment of
intra-euro area competitiveness divergences
and external imbalances should be largely
one-sided, ie only deficit countries should
adjust.One of the 2012 Council recommenda-
tions for Germany was “create conditions for
wages to grow in line with productivity”, yet
even this suggestion was not ambitious
enough, because it referred to future develop-
ments and not to the correction of past diver-
gences. But the 2013 recommendations for
Germany do not even mention the relationship
of wages to productivity or the need for a more
symmetric intra-euro adjustment, but provide
only a general comment on wage growth, as
we noted in point 5. The recommendations for
Germany and the Netherlands also fail to men-
tion these countries' current-account sur-
pluses, which are larger than the threshold in
the MIP8. The European Commission’s back-
ground document for Germany does say that
Germany and the rest of the euro area would
benefit from the unwinding of current account
surpluses in Germany, but this is said very
cautiously and hidden somewhere in a 30-
page working document and this issue is not
addressed in the country-specific recommen-
dations9. 
We note that symmetric intra-euro area price
adjustments would be necessary not just for
rebalancing price-competitiveness between
euro-area deficit and surplus countries, but
also for public debt sustainability. Competi-
tiveness adjustment in deficit countries
requires persistently lower inflation than in
major trading partners, but low inflation wors-
ens public debt sustainability. When inflation
in surplus countries is low (eg below two per-
cent), inflation has to be even lower in south-
ern Europe, undermining debt sustainability
(Darvas, 2013b). The Council recommenda-
tions also do not consider this important inter-
play between intra-euro adjustment and public
debt sustainability.
8 The country-specific recommendations high-
light the need for domestic markets to be
opened to greater competition, particularly in
the service sectors and in public procurement,
but lack EU level initiatives.The recommenda-
tions rightly stress the significant potential
growth that could be stimulated by opening up
regulated professions, which are generally
protected by high barriers to entry. But the rec-
ommendations focus on country-specific solu-
tions. However, associations of professionals
have powerful tools for lobbying national par-
liaments; these tools have traditionally been
used to shield professions from external com-
petition, making national progress slow and
often incomplete. It is therefore desirable to
promote complementary initiatives at the EU
level in order to speed-up the convergence of
professional services regulation in member
states, and to increase domestic competition.
The 2006 Services Directive could serve that
purpose, but additional effort at EU level is
needed in order to promote the effective and
uniform implementation of the Directive
throughout Europe. Likewise, the recommen-
dations rightly stress the need for an increase
in competition in network industries, such as
telecommunications, energy and transport
and, particularly, railway services. It appears
however that a key role in the opening of
national markets to competition should be
0
5
10
15
20
25
Euro area Germany N’lands France Italy Spain
Public Private Total
Figure 5: Gross ﬁxed capital formation (% of
GDP) in 2012
Source: AMECO.
8. Note that the MIP
thresholds for current
account balances are
asymmetric: plus 6 percent
of GDP for surpluses and
minus 4 percent of GDP for
deficits (considering the 3
year backward moving
average of the current
account balance as percent
of GDP).
9. We also note that in 2011
and 2012 Germany became
the country with the largest
current account surplus in
the world, ahead of China. 10
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION DOES THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER DELIVER THE RIGHT POLICY ADVICE? Darvas & Vihriälä
played at an EU level, by reducing single
market fragmentation and stimulating cross-
border competition10.
9 The suggestions for financial sector repair go
in the right direction, but remain too timid.
Although the euro-area recommendations
include a call to limit national supervisory
incentives for re-nationalisation of bank assets
and liabilities, this is absent from the country-
specific recommendations. Another issue that
is not properly addressed is the general under-
capitalisation of the European banking
system, which extends to the core countries.
The US banking system remains better capi-
talised, although the euro area should
arguably aim even higher.
10 The most comprehensive recommendations
are on structural reforms aimed at improving
the functioning of labour and product markets
and making the business environment more
growth-friendly. There are several specific
suggestions for, for example, France, Italy and
Spain on complementing labour market
reforms. These are important questions to be
addressed to ensure the long-run viability of
the monetary union and national social
contracts. 
11 Recommendations on improving public
finance management all point toward the right
goals.Several countries are told to improve the
efficiency and quality of their public expendi-
tures, including healthcare and pension
reform, to extend public procurement, to com-
plement national fiscal governance frame-
works and to reform the relationship between
central and local governments.
Based on these observations, we therefore con-
clude that the main priorities of the Council's coun-
try-specific recommendations are:
￿ Complete fiscal consolidation, with a view to
the composition of the adjustment (‘growth
friendly’);
￿ Reform of labour markets;
￿ To stimulate competition in services and
improve the business environment;
￿ To improve public finance management
through institutional reforms.
Meanwhile, the following areas are not a priority
in country-specific recommendations in an appro-
priate way:
￿ Demand management;
￿ Symmetric intra-euro area competitiveness
and current-account adjustment (even though
the euro-area recommendations underline the
importance of adjustment of both current
account surpluses and deficits);
￿ Repair and reform of the financial system
(even though the euro-area recommendations
emphasise the importance of bank balance-
sheet clean-up, recapitalisation and the
removal of national supervisory barriers to
financial integration).
Therefore, even considering the limitations inher-
ent in the European economic governance frame-
work, the July 2013 Council recommendations do
not go far enough in addressing a number of
important challenges. Furthermore, certain tasks
that pertain to the national authority are assigned
to the euro area with little prospect of meaningful
action.
Table 2 in the Annex summarises the IMF's
July/August recommendations as concluded in its
Article IV consultations11. While the IMF uses care-
ful language, does not suggest a radical departure
from current policies and could have been more
ambitious in certain aspects, in our assessment
the IMF recommendations better correspond to
the economic situation of the euro area than the
Council’s recommendations. The IMF favours a
less-austere fiscal stance for the euro area (such
as welcoming a modest loosening in Germany and
suggesting a recalibration of fiscal policies if
growth does not strengthen as envisioned; no fur-
ther fiscal consolidation in 2013 in the Nether-
lands; some easing in France), suggests
measures to achieve a more symmetrical intra-
euro area adjustment (such as increasing the
wage share and higher consumption and invest-
ment in surplus countries), and makes country-
specific suggestions for financial-sector repair, in
addition the overall suggestions for the euro area.
10. This assessment was
made by Mario Mariniello.
11. We note that Article IV
recommendations reflect
the opinion of IMF staff, and
not necessarily the
decision making bodies of
the IMF.11
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12. See Zachmann (2013)
for a blueprint on how to
reap significant benefits
from an integrated Euro-
pean electricity market.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The July 2013 Council recommendations for the
euro area and for its member states recognise a
number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges
but do not go far enough in exploiting the policy
options offered by the European economic gover-
nance framework.
The recommendations are most comprehensive
when they deal with structural reforms, including
labour market reform and fiscal governance. The
recommendations also rightly stress the signifi-
cant potential growth that could be stimulated by
opening domestic markets to greater competition,
particularly in the service sectors, though several
regulatory issues are delegated to the national
level when EU-level initiatives are also needed.
The opposite is true for macroeconomic policies:
certain suggestions are made for the euro area,
such as achieving an adequate aggregate fiscal
stance in the euro area, symmetric adjustment of
intra-euro area imbalances and financial sector
repair, but these suggestions are not (or not prop-
erly) reflected in the country-specific recommen-
dations. It is therefore unclear who will implement
the euro-area recommendations.
￿ The concept of “aggregate fiscal stance of the
euro area” has no implications for policy,
because the optimal fiscal stance of the euro
area is not defined and each country is advised
to implement its own fiscal strategy, without
any regard to its impact on the rest of the euro
area.
￿ Demand management receives almost no
attention at a time when private consumption
and investment is falling in the euro area and
the output gap is largely negative. In our view,
fiscal consolidation has to continue in those
countries that have high public debts and
deficits, like Spain, but those countries, like
Germany, that have over-performed against the
European and national fiscal targets, should
have been advised to boost private and public
investment.
￿ The country-specific Council recommendations
do not place enough importance on symmetric
intra-euro area competitiveness and current-
account adjustments. This shortcoming will
make adjustment in former deficit countries
much more difficult. Furthermore, lack of sym-
metric price adjustment will worsen public debt
sustainability in southern Europe.
￿ Suggestions for the repair and reform of the
financial sector are also too timid, and the
country-specific recommendations largely
BOX 2: ENERGY SECTOR RECOMMENDATIONS
The Council's structural recommendations also include suggestions for the energy sector, and high-
light a number of serious short-term issues, such as the tariff deficits in Spain, high renewables cost
in Germany and inadequate national and/or international networks in France, Germany, Italy and
Spain.
However, important long-term developments that undermine the functioning of the internal energy
market are not addressed. France and Germany are moving ahead with the implementation of
national capacity mechanisms that might result in national schemes driving investment, instead
of a European market incentivising the most economic solution. Nor do the Council's recommenda-
tions address the direct and indirect inefficiencies of national renewable support schemes – com-
pared to using existing cooperation tools. Developments like the discussion on a special coal tax in
the Netherlands, which would undermine the EU emissions trading system – the cornerstone of
European decarbonisation efforts – are also not on the Council's radar screen. Finally, volatile and
uncoordinated national energy policymaking that lacks a clear vision about how energy investments
should be remunerated in the future are not discussed. Such ad-hocmeasures not only make the
sector ‘uninvestable’ but also prevent the development of a stable European regulatory framework.
Overall, the Council documents do not address the worrying trends of divergence in the European
internal energy market12.
This box was prepared by Georg Zachmann.12
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miss the national to-do list corresponding to the
euro-area recommendations on bank balance-
sheet clean-up, bank recapitalisation and
reversing financial fragmentation.
While the IMF's July/August 2013 recommenda-
tions could have been more ambitious in certain
aspects, still, they better correspond to the euro
area's economic situation by favouring a less-aus-
tere fiscal stance, more symmetric intra-euro area
adjustment, and by making country-specific sug-
gestions for financial sector repair.
The President of the Euro Group is in a difficult
position to facilitate the collective and individual
actions of the euro area's member states. If a
country is in a somewhat better economic situa-
tion than the rest of the euro area (eg Germany), it
is difficult to convince its leaders and parliamen-
tarians that they should implement certain meas-
ures (partly) for the sake of other countries.
Conversely, a country in a worse economic situa-
tion than the rest of the euro area (eg Italy) might
not have the fiscal space to address its own
demand-shortage problem. Overall, this renders
the euro area's aggregate fiscal stance overly
tight. These inherent difficulties highlight the
incompleteness of the euro area's economic gov-
ernance framework and underline the need for fur-
ther reforms, including the establishment of a
fiscal authority responsible for the management
of the euro area's aggregate fiscal stance. 
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ANNEX: IMF Article IV recommendations for the euro area
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L
o
w
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
x
 
w
e
d
g
e
,
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
w
 
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
;
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
e
a
r
l
y
 
c
h
i
l
d
h
o
o
d
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
;
R
e
v
i
e
w
 
t
h
e
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
t
o
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
 
i
t
s
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
d
u
a
l
i
t
y
;
L
i
m
i
t
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
t
o
t
w
o
 
y
e
a
r
s
;
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
.
T
a
c
k
l
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
;
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
b
i
t
e
 
o
f
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
;
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
i
n
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
t
r
a
p
s
 
f
o
r
 
y
o
u
n
g
a
n
d
 
l
o
w
-
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
;
B
e
t
t
e
r
 
j
o
b
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
.
R
a
i
s
e
 
l
o
w
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
a
m
o
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
y
o
u
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
w
o
m
e
n
;
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
d
u
a
l
i
t
y
;
L
o
w
e
r
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
 
e
a
r
n
e
r
s
;
E
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
’
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
;
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
d
u
a
l
i
t
y
;
E
n
h
a
n
c
e
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
;
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
m
b
i
n
i
n
g
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
m
i
s
e
s
,
 
w
a
g
e
 
m
o
d
-
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
.
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
/
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
P
r
o
m
o
t
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
v
i
a
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
)
;
P
r
o
m
o
t
e
 
n
e
w
 
F
T
A
s
;
F
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
l
e
v
e
l
;
L
o
w
e
r
 
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
e
n
t
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
i
t
.
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
d
i
s
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
 
i
n
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
r
i
s
k
,
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
;
P
r
o
m
o
t
e
 
w
i
d
e
s
p
r
e
a
d
 
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
I
C
T
;
A
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
a
n
-
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
.
D
i
s
t
o
r
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
h
o
u
s
i
n
g
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
n
e
e
d
t
o
 
b
e
 
e
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
;
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
b
a
s
i
c
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
e
d
u
c
a
-
t
i
o
n
.
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
s
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
,
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
-
u
l
a
r
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
h
i
g
h
 
e
n
t
r
y
 
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
-
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
i
n
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
)
;
R
e
d
u
c
e
 
h
i
g
h
 
c
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
;
E
n
a
c
t
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
g
e
n
d
a
;
L
e
g
a
l
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
.
E
n
a
c
t
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
 
t
o
 
r
e
m
o
v
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
f
r
a
g
m
e
n
t
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
,
p
r
o
m
o
t
e
 
e
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
s
h
i
p
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
-
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
y
s
t
e
m
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
S
M
E
s
(
E
C
B
,
 
E
I
B
,
 
E
C
)
;
A
s
s
e
t
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
b
y
r
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
;
A
g
r
e
e
 
o
n
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
b
a
c
k
s
t
o
p
 
(
E
S
M
?
)
;
F
i
n
a
l
i
s
e
 
S
S
M
;
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
 
S
R
M
;
C
l
a
r
i
f
y
 
b
a
i
l
-
i
n
 
r
u
l
e
s
.
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
;
R
a
i
s
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
R
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
r
e
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
w
h
o
l
e
s
a
l
e
 
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
 
n
e
c
-
e
s
s
a
r
y
.
T
a
x
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
o
n
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
-
u
c
t
s
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
a
l
i
g
n
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
b
a
n
k
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
.
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
t
a
x
 
 
d
e
d
u
c
t
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
l
o
a
n
l
o
s
s
e
s
;
E
n
s
u
r
e
 
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
-
i
t
y
 
b
u
f
f
e
r
s
;
E
n
h
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
;
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
S
M
E
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
.
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
;
C
l
e
a
n
 
u
p
 
l
o
a
n
 
b
o
o
k
s
;
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
s
u
p
p
l
y
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
.
I
n
t
r
a
-
e
u
r
o
 
a
r
e
a
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
T
h
e
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
s
o
 
f
a
r
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
s
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
 
a
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
;
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
a
n
d
 
s
i
z
e
a
b
l
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
d
e
p
r
e
c
i
-
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
5
-
1
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
 
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
 
f
o
r
s
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
i
p
h
e
r
a
l
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
S
u
r
p
l
u
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
n
o
n
-
t
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
s
 
t
o
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
;
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
w
o
u
l
d
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
f
 
e
u
r
o
-
a
r
e
a
 
u
n
c
e
r
-
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
i
s
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
;
D
e
f
i
c
i
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
(
l
o
w
e
r
 
c
o
s
t
s
,
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
s
t
r
u
c
-
t
u
r
a
l
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
,
 
r
e
p
a
i
r
 
b
a
n
k
s
)
.
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
n
c
o
m
e
.
(
n
o
t
h
i
n
g
)
T
a
c
k
l
e
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
c
o
s
t
s
;
R
i
s
k
 
o
f
 
f
a
l
l
i
n
g
 
b
e
h
i
n
d
 
s
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
c
r
i
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
i
n
g
 
l
a
r
g
e
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
g
a
i
n
s
.
S
o
 
f
a
r
,
 
l
i
t
t
l
e
 
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
e
u
r
o
 
a
r
e
a
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
h
e
l
p
f
u
l
t
o
;
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
d
e
b
t
R
e
s
o
l
v
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
b
a
d
 
d
e
b
t
;
U
s
e
 
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
m
o
r
e
b
o
l
d
l
y
.
(
n
o
t
h
i
n
g
)
(
n
o
t
h
i
n
g
)
A
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
e
 
w
r
i
t
e
-
o
f
f
 
o
f
 
b
a
d
 
l
o
a
n
s
;
E
x
p
e
d
i
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
o
f
w
r
i
t
e
-
d
o
w
n
s
.
R
e
f
o
r
m
 
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
 
r
e
g
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
c
e
n
-
t
i
v
i
s
e
 
w
r
i
t
e
-
o
f
f
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
b
a
l
-
a
n
c
e
 
s
h
e
e
t
 
c
l
e
a
n
-
u
p
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
r
u
e
g
e
l
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
o
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
t
h
e
 
D
u
t
c
h
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
1
3
;
 
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
J
u
l
y
/
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
2
0
1
3
.